Poland

VII - Six-Pack

The ‘Six-Pack’ is a package of six legislative measures (five regulations and one directive) improving the Economic governance in the EU. The Commission made the original proposals in September 2010. After negotiations between the Council and the European Parliament, the package was adopted in November 2011 and entered into force on December 13, 2011. Part of the ‘Six-Pack’ measures applies only to the Eurozone member states (see the individual titles below).          
The ‘Six-Pack’ measures reinforce the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), among others by introducing a new Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure, new sanctions (for Eurozone member states) and reversed qualified majority voting. Also, there is more attention for the debt-criterion.        
(
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/index_en.htm)

Negotiation
VII.1
What positions did Poland adopt in the negotiation of the ‘Six-Pack’, in particular in relation to the implications of the ‘Six-Pack’ for (budgetary) sovereignty, constitutional law
, socio-economic fundamental rights, and the budgetary process?

In general terms the government was supportive towards the Six Pack.[1]  The critical points were raised with regard to specific measures (cf. questions VII.6, VII.9, VII.13, VII.14).

With regard to the directive, the government expressed a positive view during the Senat European Affairs Committee meeting.[2] The only critical comment was on the frequency of the statistical statements that are supposed to be done every month, which is not feasible in some sectors. Hence the government proposed a change that the statistical statements with regard to the non-central sectors should be taking place every four months. The Committee’s rapporteur, senator Jan Wyrowiński, also critically assessed the frequency of statistical statements, but in general positively opined the proposed directive, as did also the whole Senat’s European Affairs Committee.

Directive 2011/85/EU 
Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States

Implementation   
VII.2
What measures are being taken to implement Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks (required before 31 December 2013, article 15 Directive 2011/85/EU)?

The new fiscal rule is a partial implementation of the directive (Art. 5-7).[3]

The Law on Public Finances has been also adjusted to implement Chapter V of the directive.[4]

Implementation of Art. 6 (1)(b) of the directive, does not demand any changes in Polish law.[5]

Law on Public Finances and Law on Accounting contains already provisions demanded by the directive (Chapter 1 – Art. 2, Chapter II – Art.3, Chapter VI- Art. 12, Chapter III – Art. 4, Chapter VI – Art. 13).[6]

Implementation difficulties         
VII.3
What political/legal difficulties
did Poland encounter in the implementation process, in particular in relation to implications of the directive for (budgetary) sovereignty, constitutional law and the budgetary process?

So far, the new directive is implemented by the forthcoming stabilising fiscal rule. (See question VII.2). The parliamentary debate of 8 November 2013 shows however that the adoption of the new fiscal rule in order to implement the directive has a rather secondary meaning. The MPs mention that the adoption of the rule will “at the same time” implement the EU directive. [7]

There were no specific points about the budgetary sovereignty and constitutional law, but the criticism of the opposition was that the rule will have a negative impact on the public finances as it allows the government to waive the public debt of 50%GDP security threshold (Cf. Question III.3).[8]

Macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts   
VII.4
What institution will be responsible for producing macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts (article 4(5) Directive 2011/85/EU)? What institution will conduct an unbiased and comprehensive evaluation of these forecasts (article 4(6) Directive 2011/85/EU)?

The existing provisions of Polish law are sufficiently regulating macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts and no additional implementing provisions are necessary.[9]

In short, the Ministry of Finance, Department of Analysis and Forecasts prepares the assessments after consultations with other institutions. Specifically, Rada Polityki Pieniężnej assesses the budgetary forecasts and the Tripartite Committee for Socio Economic Affairs receive the forecasts of macroeconomic forecasts.

The Convergence Programme 2013 gives following details on the forecasts: “[t]he fiscal data will be published on the website of the Ministry of Finance: monthly – concerning the central government sub-sector and social security funds sub-sector (with a one-month delay) and quarterly – concerning the local government sub-sector (with a one-quarter delay). A reconciliation table showing the methodology of transition between data from public accounting and the statistics of general government, in accordance with ESA 95, will also be available on the website.” [10] However, so far the forecasts of the Ministry of Finance are based on the data from the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund and OECD.

The Central Statistical Office will publish data concerning: “contingent liabilities with potentially significant impact on the budget, including those relating to non-performing loans, liabilities of public enterprises, public-private partnership agreements considered off-balance sheet, guarantees granted by the sector as a whole and all sub-sectors, as well as the shares of general government in the capital of private and public companies (if the amounts are economically significant).”[11] As a next step, “the government compares its forecasts with the projections of other institutions and presents them to different institutional bodies (Monetary Policy Council, Tripartite Commission for Social and Economic Affairs, parliament, banking analysts) to receive their opinion.”[12]

The information provided by Poland to the European Commission indicates the following ways of forecasts’ assessments[13]:

Firstly, budgetary forecasts are assessed by the Central Bank and its Monetary Policy Council. Article 23(1)(2) of the Act on the National Bank of Poland calls for the President of the NBP, on behalf of the Monetary Policy Council, to submit opinions on the draft Budget Act to the Council of Ministers and the Minister of Finance.

Secondly, the government submits its forecasts to the Tripartite Commission for Social and Economic Affairs. The Commission is a forum for social dialogue in order to reconcile the interests of employees, the interests of employers and public welfare. Under Article 3 of the ‘Act on the Tripartite Commission for Social and Economic Affairs and Voivodship social dialogue commissions’, the government should present a preliminary macroeconomic forecast to the Tripartite Commission each year as a basis for the budget bill for the next year. No later than 15 June, the government must send the Commission its assumptions for next year’s budget draft. The social partners (i.e. representatives of employers and employees) have six days to express their views.

Thirdly, at the beginning of the budgetary process, the Ministry of Finance, which is responsible for preparing macroeconomic forecasts, usually organises a meeting with private bank economists to exchange views on the short- and medium-term prospects of the Polish economy.

Finally, after submission of the budget bill to the Polish parliament’s lower chamber (Sejm), the members of parliament can express their opinion on it.

The Polish authorities also mention that, as a rule, the macroeconomic forecasts used for budgetary planning are based on the external assumptions provided by the European Commission (spring or Autumn Forecast). If these are not available when the Polish projections are prepared, the projections of other international institutions are used (e.g. IMF or OECD).

Finally, the macroeconomic forecasts used for budgetary planning are assessed ex post by the Supreme Audit Office.[14] Under Article 182 of the Public Finance Act, the Council of Ministers must submit to the Sejm and to the Supreme Audit Office by 31 May an Annual Report on the implementation of the budget act for the previous year. The Supreme Audit Office (SAO) presents its opinion on the implementation of the previous year’s budget act, with reference to the macroeconomic assumptions.”

Fiscal Council   
VII.5
Does Poland have in place an independent Fiscal Council (article 6(1) Directive 2011/85/EU: ‘independent bodies or bodies endowed with functional autonomy vis-à-vis the fiscal authorities of the Member States’)? What are its main characteristics? Does Poland have to create (or adapt) a Fiscal Council in order to implement Directive 2011/85/EU?

A Fiscal Council has to be created.[15] So far, the government did not submit any proposal to create a Fiscal Council, as the Supreme Audit Office (Najwyższa Izba Kontroli), a constitutional organ, currently exercises a function comparable to the Fiscal Council. (Cf. Art. 202-207 of the Polish Constitution).

Regulation No 1176/2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances           
(
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32011R1176:EN:NOT)

MEIP difficulties      
VII.6
What political/legal difficulties
did Poland encounter and what debates have arisen, in particular about implications of the regulation for (budgetary) sovereignty, constitutional law, socio-economic fundamental rights, and the budgetary process?

On 5 November 2011, the Sejm’s European Affairs Committee discussed this proposal.[16] The Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Finance, Jacek Dominik, positively opined the proposal.[17] The only point of concern for the government was to make sure that the recommendations issued by the Commission within the excessive deficit procedure and the macroeconomic imbalances procedure were not contradictory to each other.[18] Moreover, the government’s representative underlined that in general Poland is in a good situation when it comes to the economic imbalances, the existing constitutional provisions and the budgetary law provisions function well in this regard. The Sejm’s European Affairs Committee did not raise any concerns with regard to the proposal.

On 16 November 2010, the Senat’s European Affairs Committee discussed this proposal and the concerns were identical to the ones in the Sejm’s committee[19]

Regulation No 1175/2011 on strengthening budgetary surveillance positions          
(
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1997R1466:20111213:EN:PDF)

MTO procedure    
VII.7
What changes to the rules on the budgetary process are made to accommodate the amended Medium-term Budgetary Objective (MTO) Procedure?

Poland plans to introduce a new fiscal rule through an amendment to the Public Finances Act (Cf. Question VII.2) aiming at “stabilis[ing] the nominal general government balance at the MTO level in the medium term and prevent public debt from breaching a predefined threshold corresponding to the reference value stipulated in the TFEU.”[20] 

The amendment of the Public Finances Act entered into force at the end of 2013 (it has been signed by the president on 23 Dec. 2013.)[21] The rule is expressed in Art. 112aa of the Public Finances Act.

Next to the existing rules anchored in the Constitution and the Public Finances Act (Cf. Question III.3) the new rule allows, on the one hand, a security margin with regard to the 3% budget deficit, so that the risk of the excessive deficit procedure is minimised and, on the other hand some flexibility in the budgetary planning (especially investment).[22]

The new fiscal rule (‘stabilising fiscal rule’) replaces the current ‘disciplinary fiscal rule’ enshrined in Art.112a Law on Public Finances. The new rule has a wider scope than the previous one, as it concerns the expenditures of both governmental and self-government institutions (general government). This comparatively broader scope aims at accommodating the provisions of the Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 to cover the largest extent public expenditures.[23] The rule foresees the absolute limit of spending; it is the government expenditure diminished by the expenses of local governments and their associations, other institutions foreseen in art. 139(2) of the Public Finances Act and the total cost of the National Health Fund. The rule does not apply with regard to budget spending of EU funds and that part of the expenditure which is financed by means of a non-refundable grant from the EU and EFTA countries and the costs of units which do not have the ability to generate high deficits.

“The medium-term horizon for meeting the general government balance target should provide space for countercyclical fiscal policy, as deviations from the target would be allowed in the short run. To reach the MTO, the rule also sets an overall expenditure growth cap for general government, net of expenditure financed with non-returnable EU funds. The formula for the growth cap is based on the medium-term GDP growth rate. Significant deviations of the general government balance from the MTO in the medium term, a high level of public debt, or the initiation of the EDP procedure will trigger a correction mechanism”. [24]

The Ministry of Finance specifies further, how the rule will correct the imbalance in public finances:

If public debt (calculated using the average annual exchange rate and reduced by free cash to fund next year’s borrowing requirements) exceeds 55% of GDP or the deficit (including pension reform costs) exceeds 3% of GDP, the stronger correction is applied (2 percentage points subtracted from the medium real GDP growth). This adjustment takes place regardless of the economic forecast. Otherwise, if the debt exceeds 50% of GDP, a normal correction is applied (1.5 percentage points), unless strong economic slowdown is projected (next year’s projected real GDP growth lower by over 2 percentage points than mid-term – the so-called “bad times”).

Where none of the above conditions is met, the correction depends on the sum of the differences between the general government nominal balance and the medium-term budgetary objective – MTO (currently 1% of GDP). The purpose of this corrective mechanism is a temporary reduction (increase) in the amount of expenditure growth below (above) the real medium-term GDP growth, as long as there are excessive deviations from the target. This mechanism will ensure long-term sustainability of public finances. It is worth noting that the mechanism is automatic and precisely determines the type of correction. If the sum of the differences exceeds -6% (+6%) of GDP, a simple negative (positive) correction is applied. The exception is “bad times”, when the negative correction is suspended and the “good times” (projected next year’s real GDP increase by over 2 percentage points than the mid-term) when the positive correction is suspended symmetrically.’[25]

European semester     
VII.8
What changes have to be made to the rules and practices on the national budgetary timeline to implement the new rules on a European Semester for economic policy coordination (section 1-A, article 2-a consolidated Regulation 1466/97)?

According to my knowledge, the only adjustment of the budgetary timeline is that the Actual Convergence Programme is now published in April, which accelerates the works on the Multi-Year Financial Plan of the State. [26]

MTO difficulties
VII.9
What political/legal difficulties
did Poland encounter and what debates have arisen, in particular about implications of the regulation for (budgetary) sovereignty, constitutional law and the budgetary process?

On 19 November 2010, the Sejm’s European Affairs Committee decided not to make any critical comments with regard to this proposal.[27]

On 16 November 2010, the Senat’s European Affairs Committee discussed this proposal. The Minister’s Advisor in the Ministry of Finance, Marta Barańczak, underlined that in general, the government has a positive opinion on this proposal.[28]  She raised, however, two points. First, the government perceived that the 0,5% GDP and 0,25% GDP (in two years) reference points for a Commission warning are too high.[29] Second, when it comes to the expenses that the Commission may assess, the representative of the Ministry of Finance highlighted that Poland is one of the beneficiaries of the EU subventions and these should not be taken into account by the Commission when assessing the expenses in the governmental and self-governmental sector.[30] The MP Rapporteur shared the government’s opinion on the proposal, but in general positively opined it and the committee supported it.[31]

Respect MTO      
VII.10
How is respect of the Medium-term Budgetary Objective included in the national budgetary framework (section 1A, article 2a consolidated Regulation 1466/97)?

Art. 142 pt 3 of the Public Finances Act provides that the MTO should be included in the Budget (ustawa budżetowa). The government plans to include the respect of the MTO in the national budgetary plans. Namely, according to the planned fiscal rule, significant deviations of the general government balance from the MTO in the medium term, will trigger a correction mechanism (Cf. question VII.2, VII.4, VII.7). “This will reduce the expenditure growth limit below the medium term GDP growth rate until the excessive deviation from the target is corrected. The correction mechanism is not expected to be fully automatic, as it will take into account cyclical developments. Escape clauses will come into effect only in the case of war or martial law. Monitoring of compliance with the rule is to be carried out by the Supreme Audit Office.”[32]

Current MTO     
VII.11
What is Poland’s current Medium-term Budgetary Objective (section 1A, article 2a consolidated Regulation 1466/97)? When will it be revised?

Poland adopted its medium-term budgetary objective that is the target structural general government balance at the level of -1% of GDP and is currently on the adjustment path toward that objective.[33] It is planned that Poland will achieve its medium-term budgetary objective by 2016.[34]

Adoption MTO   
VII.12
By what institution and through what procedure is Poland’s Medium-term Budgetary Objective adopted and incorporated in the stability programme (Eurozone, article 3(2)(a) consolidated Regulation 1466/97)?

Art. 142 pt 3 of the Public Finances Act provides that the government which prepares the budgetary act (budżet; ustawa budżetowa) annexes a justification which contains, among others, the MTO.

Regulation No 1177/2011 on the excessive deficit procedure

(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1997R1467:20111213:EN:PDF)

EDP difficulties  
VII.13
What political/legal difficulties
did Poland encounter and what debates have arisen, in particular about implications of the regulation for (budgetary) sovereignty, constitutional law and the budgetary process?

On 3 November 2010 Senat’s European Affairs Committee discussed the proposal of this regulation on its meeting.[35] The Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Finance, who generally negatively assessed the draft regulation, underlined that one of Poland’s points was to include in the Excessive Deficit Procedure the costs of retirement pensions reforms.[36] Moreover, one of the issues proposed by Poland was to eliminate the 5-year period that the proposal applies in this matter and to allow for a constant inclusion of the pension reform into the public finances.[37] Finally, Poland supported inclusion of the public debt of 60%, as it is unproblematic from Poland’s own perspective. The discussion between the senators concerned mainly the inclusion and exclusion of the pension system reform into the excessive deficit procedure, and the senators negatively opined the draft regulation.[38]

In the Sejm, similar arguments were raised on 5 November 2010, when the European Affairs Committee discussed this proposal.[39] The Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Finance, Jacek Dominik, underlined that the proposed regulation should standardize the base for assessing the budgetary deficit and public debt.[40] The underlining problem was that the Commission would apply the excessive deficit procedure to Member States that reformed their pension schemes: the costs of such reform enlarge the debt. Hence, the government negatively opined the proposed regulation. The opposition agreed with the negative position of the government towards the proposal, especially as Poland would not be able to justify its deficit with the pension reform: namely, the proposal foresees that this may be done just within 5 years, whereas the Polish reform started in 1999.[41] This proposal, in the view of the opposition MPs, did not encourage Member States, which did not conduct a pensions reform, to actually introduce such reforms.

Similarly, before the ECOFIN meeting in March 2011, the government again expressed concerns with regard to this proposal and the retirement pensions reform.

In Poland exists excessive deficit of the general government. The recommendations issued by the Council in order to lower the deficit has not been fulfilled by Poland by the end of 2013.[42]The Commission and the Council has issued new recommendations allowing Poland to bring an end to the excessive deficit by 2015.[43]

The new stabilising fiscal rule is expected to ensure sustainability of public finances in Poland and will correct their possible excessive imbalances.[44] (Question VII.7)

Also since 2011, the Public Finances Act, “prohibits the Council of Ministers from adopting certain draft acts while Poland is subject to the excessive deficit procedure. These include:

  • stipulating exemptions, reliefs and deductions whose financial outcome may be a reduction in the income of general government units in relation to the amounts resulting from applicable regulations;
  • causing an increase in state budget expenditure which is not covered by the temporary rule (CPI+1)

Fiscal self-discipline has been strengthened for ministries which are responsible for draft legislation which has financial consequences. In draft acts adopted by the Council of Ministers, whose financial consequences may cause a change in the level of general government expenditure in relation to the amounts resulting from present regulations, the limits of these expenditures have to be determined, expressed as a value, for a period of 10 budget years from the execution of the act, separately for each year, starting from the first year when the act enters into force. This requirement will remain in effect even when Poland will not be subject to the excessive deficit procedure. In addition, such a draft has to determine:

– corrective mechanisms when the maximum limit of expenditures adopted for a given budget year is exceeded or is in danger of being exceeded;

– a competent authority which monitors the use of the expenditure limit for performance of public tasks by general government units;

– a competent authority responsible for the implementation of corrective mechanisms.”[45]

Regulation No 1173/2011 on effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance    
(
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32011R1173:EN:NOT)
Sanctions
VII.14
What political/legal difficulties
did Poland encounter and what debates have arisen, in particular about implications of the regulation for (budgetary) sovereignty, constitutional law and the budgetary process?

On 5 November 2010[46] and 11 March 2011,[47] in the Sejm’s European Affairs Committee the government expressed no concerns with regard to this proposal.

On 16 November 2010, in the Senat’s European Affairs Committee, the Minister’s Advisor in the Ministry of Finance positively opined this proposal.[48] The Minister’s Advisor presented an idea that the sanction rules included in the proposal could also apply to Poland, if the sanctions were similarly applying to all the Member States and if the proposal would appropriately take into account the costs of the pensions reform.

General changes 
VII.15
What further changes have to be made to the rules on the budgetary process in order to comply with the Six-Pack rules?

Not relevant for Poland.

Miscellaneous
VII.16
What other information is relevant with regard to Poland and the Six-Pack?

No other relevant information.

[1]  Sejm EAC, Komisja do Spraw Unii Europejskiej Nr 224, Nr 4678/VI, 3.02.2011, p.4, http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/SQL.nsf/Main6?OpenForm&SUE.

[2]  Cf. Senat, EAC, Zapis stenograficzny 1821, 121. Posiedzenie Komisji Spraw Unii Europejskiej, 3.11.2010, pp.7-8.

[3]  Uzasadnienie do ustawy o zmianie ustawy o finansach publicznych, p. 3.

[4]  Uzasadnienie do ustawy o zmianie ustawy o finansach publicznych, p. 3.

[5]  Uzasadnienie do ustawy o zmianie ustawy o finansach publicznych, p. 3

[6]  Uzasadnienie do ustawy o zmianie ustawy o finansach publicznych, p. 3.

[7]  53. Posiedzenie Sejmu, 6.11.2013, p. 33, 36 available at :http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/StenoInter7.nsf/0/E26DFF9E0EB222A8C1257C1C000A4708/%24File/53_a_ksiazka.pdf

[8]  53. Posiedzenie Sejmu, 6.11.2013, p. 39 available at :http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/StenoInter7.nsf/0/E26DFF9E0EB222A8C1257C1C000A4708/%24File/53_a_ksiazka.pdf

[9]  Uzasadnienie do ustawy o zmianie ustawy o finansach publicznych, p. 5.

[10] Convergence Programme 2013, p. 41.

[11]  Convergence Programme 2013, p. 41.

[12] European Commission, Interim Progress Report on the implementation of Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, February 2013, p. 70.

[13] European Commission, Interim Progress Report on the implementation of Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, February 2013, p. 70.

[14] Supreme Audit Office (Najwyższa Izba Kontroli) is a constitutional body (Art. 202 of the Constitution). It is an independent body. It has a collegial composition. The President of the Supreme Audit Office is appointed by the Sejm, with the consent of the Senate, for a period of 6 years, which may be extended for one more period only. The Supreme Audit Office  includes, except for its president and vicepresidents and the director general, also 7 representatives of lega lor economic sciences and 7 directors of control institutes. Cf. http://www.nik.gov.pl/o-nik/

[15] Cf. K. Marchewka-Bartkowiak, Ramy budżetowe państw członkowskich – nowe regulacje prawne w zakresie polityki budżetowej w Unii Europejskiej, Studia BAS Nr 3(31)2012, p. 178. On possible ways of creation of the Fiscal Council in Poland and its composition Cf. G. Gołębiowski, K. Marchewka-Bartkowiak, Niezależna Instytucja (Rada) Fiskalna – międzynarodowe modele instytucjonalne. Wnioski dla Polski, Analizy BAS, nr 2(91), 26.03.2013.

[16]  Komisja do Spraw Unii Europejskiej Nr 204, Nr 4349/VI kad. 5.11.2010, http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/SQL.nsf/Main6?OpenForm&SUE.

[17]  Id, p.9.

[18] Similarly, cf. Sejm, SUE, 3.02.2011, p. 14

[19]  Senat, Zapis stenograficzny 1840, 122. Posiedzenie Komisji Spraw Unii Europejskiej, p. 9-10.

[20] European Commission, Interim Progress Report on the implementation of Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, February 2013, p. 70.

[21]  http://www.prezydent.pl/prawo/ustawy/podpisane/art,41,grudzien-2013-r-.html.

[22]  Uzasadnienie do zmiany ustawy o finansach publicznych, p. 6.

[23]  Uzasadnienie do zmiany ustawy o finansach publicznych, p. 11.

[24] European Commission, Interim Progress Report on the implementation of Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, February 2013, p. 71.

[25]  Ministry of Finance ‘Information on measures taken by Poland to implement the Recommendation of the Council on Article 126.7 of the Treaty on The Functioning of the European Union of 21 June 2013,’ Appendix 1, available at the http://www.finanse.mf.gov.pl/en/web/bip/ministry-of-finance/poland-in-eu/convergence-programme/-/asset_publisher/80mX/content/information-on-measures-taken-by-poland-to-implement-the-recommendation-of-the-council-on-article-126-7-of-the-treaty-on-the-functioning-of-the-european-union-of-21-june-2013

[26] On the Multi-Year Financial Plan, cf. European Commission, Interim Progress Report on the implementation of Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, February 2014, p. 71.

[27]  Cf. Posiedzenie Komisji do Spraw Unii Europejskiej Nr 205, Biuletyn Nr 4354/VI kad. 19.11.2010, http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/SQL.nsf/Main6?OpenForm&SUE.

[28]  Senat, Zapis stenograficzny 1840, 122. Posiedzenie Komisji Spraw Unii Europejskiej, p.9.

[29]  Id.

[30]  Id, p.10.

[31]  Id, p.11.

[32] European Commission, Interim Progress Report on the implementation of Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, February 2013, p. 71.

[33]  Convergence Programme, 2013 update, Warsaw April 2013, p.22.

[34] Convergence Programme, 2013 update, Warsaw April 2013, p.22.

[35] Zapis stenograficzny (1821) 121. posiedzenie Komisji Spraw Unii Europejskiej w dniu 3.11. 2010.

[36]  Id, p. 9.

[37]  Id, p.10.

[38]  Id, p.14.

[39]  Komisja do Spraw Unii Europejskiej Nr 204, Nr 4349/VI kad. 5.11.2010, http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/SQL.nsf/Main6?OpenForm&SUE.

[40]  Id, p. 6.

[41]  Id, p. 7.

[42]  Council Recommendation with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit in Poland, 16852/13, 2.12.2013, p.4-5. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/30_edps/126-07_council/2013-12-10_pl_126-7_council_en.pdf

[43]  Council Recommendation with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit in Poland, 16852/13, 2.12.2013, p. 10. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/30_edps/126-07_council/2013-12-10_pl_126-7_council_en.pdf

[44]  http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/30_edps/other_documents/2013-10-01_pl_-_ear_-_annex_1_en.pdf

[45]  Convergence Programme 2012, p. 41.

[46] Sejm, Komisja do Spraw Unii Europejskiej Nr 204, Nr 4349/VI kad. 5.11.2010, p.5 http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/SQL.nsf/Main6?OpenForm&SUE.

[47]  Sejm, EAC, Komisja do Spraw Unii Europejskiej Nr 233, Nr 4799/VI kad, 11.03.2011 p.5 http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/SQL.nsf/Main6?OpenForm&SUE.

[48]  Zapis Stenograficzny 1840, 122. Posiedzenie Komisji Spraw Unii Europejskiej, 16.11.2010, p.2